Criminal vs. Civil Contempt by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 23 | Issue 2 Article 2
Winter 1948
Criminal vs. Civil Contempt
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Civil Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1948) "Criminal vs. Civil Contempt," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 23: Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol23/iss2/2
COMMENTS
CRIMINAL vs. C)VIL CONTEMPT
In the contempt proceedings against the United Mine
workers, Judge Goldsborough stated to the defense counsel
"If you know the exact difference between a civil and crimi-
nal contempt, you are the only person who does."' Judge
Goldsborough was perhaps right in denying that there is
any "exact difference" insofar as the distinction between
these two kinds of contempt consists of a multitude of dif-
ferences, none of which are well understood by the courts.
This lack of understanding arises in most instances because
"any given distinction between civil and criminal contempt
may be treated in one case as a basis of the classification,
and in another as a consequence of the classification."2 One
of the purposes of this article is to examine the bases and
the consequences of this distinction.
Two recent cases have presented new and have re-em-
phasized old problems' in this field. In October, 1946 the
Government was operating the major portion of the bitumi-
nous coal mines of the United States. On November 15,
1946 Mr. John L. Lewis notified the Government that the
United Mine Workers Union was terminating the Krug-Lewis
agreement under which the mines were operated. A copy
of this notification was circulated among the mine workers
for their "official information." On November 18, the Gov-
ernment obtained, in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, a temporary restraining order. On that same day
a gradual walkout commenced and by November 20 a strike
was in progress in accord with the miners "no contract, no
work" policy. Contempt proceedings were instituted against
Mr. Lewis and the Union, and on December 4, the District
Court found-the defendants guilty of both civil and criminal
contempt. Mr. Lewis was fined $10,000 and the United
Mine Workers Union was fined $3,500,000. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to the United States Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia. The opinion of the court in
United States v. United Mine Workerss presents three matters
1. 94 N.Y. Times 2:2 (November 30, 1946).
2. Moskovitz "Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal" 43 Col.
L. Rev. 780, 781 (1943). This is a leading article on the subject
and contains a detailed examination of the bases and consequences
of the classification. The citation of authorities is excellent.
3. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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for consideration. First, the Supreme Court stated that even
if the order of the District Court was issued without juris-
diction, the defendants would be guilty of criminal4 but not
civil. contempt. Second, it was held that the District Court
did not err in permitting the trial of both a civil and a
criminal contempt action in the same proceeding., Third, the
Court affirmed the fine of Mr. Lewis but reduced the fine
of the United Mine Workers to $700,000 on condition that
the defendant purge itself within a reasonable time.7
In another recent case, the Securities Exchange Com-
mission had been conducting an investigation. A subpoena
duces tecem was issued but the witness refused to produce
the documents. An application to the District Court for an
order to enforce the subpoena having been made and granted,
contempt proceedings were instituted upon the continued
refusal of the witness to comply. The District Court refused
to grant coercive relief, but did impose an unconditional fine
of $50. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the District Court erred in imposing the fine, and directed
that the witness be ordered imprisoned until he produced the
documents. In Penfield Co. of California v. Securities Ex-
change Commission,8 the Supreme Court affirmed. The case
illustrates an unusual feature: an appellate court substituted
a civil contempt remedy for the criminal contempt penalty
which had been imposed by the District Court. The case also
illustrates an all too frequent occurrence: a final determination
of the nature of the contempt proceeding was not made until
the appellate stage of the proceeding. Lastly, the case is by
implication a reaffirmation of the power of an agency of the
Government to institute civil contempt proceedings.
I. HISTORY OF THE DISTINCTION
A noted English writer on contempt stated that "the
rules for preserving discipline, essential to the administration
of justice, came into existence with the law itself, and con-
4. Id. at 294.
5. Id. at 295.
6. Id. at 299.
7. Id. at 305.
8. 330 U.S. 585 (1947). I1 a concurring opinion, Justice Rutledge
thought the holding of the majority was contra to the holding in
the United Mine Workers case to the effect that both civil and
criminal contempt could be tried together in the same proceeding.
Id. at 595.
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tempt of court ... has been a recognized phrase in English
law from the twelfth century.' ' 9 Although the origin of
contempt thus appears to be ancient, the precise instance
when the distinction between civil and criminal contempt was
first made is not clear. Mr. Beale stated that it was not
clearly and expressly recognized until late in the nineteenth
century.10 Nevertheless, there are cases which apparently
make the distinction in the seventeenth:" and eighteenth12
centuries. It seems clear that the distinction did not assume
much importance until the origin of the Court of Chancery
since "contempt as a coercive process has been the child of
equity, for the injunction has been its touchstone.' 1 3  How-
ever obscure the origin of the distinction may be, it is un-
questionably firmly embedded in our law.
II. BASIS OR CONSEQUENCE OF THE DISTINCTION?
Sources of Confusion
One cannot read many of these cases without becoming
exposed to utter confusion. "Few legal distinctions are
emptier" says one author,'14 and one court described the dis-
tinction as "resting in shadow."'- No doubt much of the
difficulty is caused by the use of the terms "civil" and "crim-
inal" to describe the two kinds of contempt proceedings.
These terms have well fixed meanings in our law. Not un-
9. Fox, "The History of Contempt of Court" 1 (1927).
10. Beale, "Contempt of Court, Civil and Criminal" 21 Harv. L. Rev.
161, 167 (1908). Mr. Beale relied upon Wellesley's Case, 2 Russ.
and My. 639, 29 Eng. Rep. 538 (1831).
11. Bartram v. Dannet, Cast. Finch 253, 23 Eng. Rep. 139 (1676);
Rex v. Rodman, Cro. Car. 198, 79 Eng. Rep. '774 (1630). In both
cases, the action was to recover costs awarded to a party in a
contempt proceeding. A pardon was pleaded. The court held
that the pardon did not extend to costs in favor of a private party.
See notes 63 and 64 for the rule on pardon.
12. King v. Meyers, 1 T.R. 265, 99 Eng. Rep. 1086 (1786) (the
defendant was attached for contempt for failing to pay a
penalty; the court held this was a civil proceeding, and, since
the defendant was apprehended on Sunday, he was released);
Roach v. Garvin, 2 Atkyns 469, 471, 26 Eng. Rep. 683, 684 (1742)
(The court stated there were three kinds of contempt, the second
kind being described as follows: "There may be likewise a con-
tempt of this court in abusing parties who are concerned in
causes here.")
13. Note, 32 Va. L. Rev. 1010, 1021 (1946). Although the violation
of an injunction is the usual situation giving rise to the dis-
tinction, the violation of a mandate may also present the dis-
tinction. Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 (1881).
14. Nelles, "The Summary Power to Punish For Contempt" 31 Col.
L. Rev. 956, 960 (1931).
15. In Re Eskay, 122 F.2d 819, 822 (C.C.A. 3d 1941).
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naturally, these meanings have been carried along with the
transfer of the terms. Were the courts today to adopt the
terms "public contempt" and "private contempt," as'suggested
in an early case,'16 much confusion would be eliminated. An-
other factor that contributes to this confusion is that "most
frequently the question of the nature and character of the
proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is determined at its
end in the stage of review rather than.., at the beginning."''
The courts have devised a number of tests upon which they
base the distinction they make in a particular case. As shall
be seen, these tests frequently are useless since they are ap-
plied at the appellate stage of the proceeding. In order to
eliminate much of the confusion, it is imperative that the
initial designation of the nature of the proceeding be made
in the trial court and that this designation be reflected in
the pleadings. Additional difficulty is encountered because
each case usually presents fact situations permitting the ap-
plication of several tests, because the results of these tests
may be diametrically opposed to each other, and because any
given test is seldom conclusive. No satisfactory evaluation of
the weight to be given any one test has ever been made.
Purpose Test
"It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character
and purpose that often serve to distinguish between the
classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt, the punishment
is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it
is for criminal . . . the sentence is punitive, to vindicate
the authority of the court."'1  This definition is almost uni-
versally accepted 19 and certainly is the best test that the
courts have devised. 20 Nevertheless, its utility depends upon
16. People v. Court of Oyer and Terminer, 101 N.Y. 245, 248, 4
N.E. 259, 260 (1886).
17. See Justice Rutledge dissenting in U.S. v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258, 368 (1947).
18. Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1910).
19. Besette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904); Denny v.
State, 203 Ind. 682, 707, 82 N.E. 313, 321 (1932); State ex rel
Chicago, B. and Q. Ry v. Bland, 189 Mo. 197, 214, 88 S.W. 28,
33 (1905) ; Drake v. National Bank, 168 Va. 230, 239, 190 S.E. 302,
306 (1937); Rapalje, "Contempt" §21 (1884); Fox, "The History
of Contempt of Court" 1 (1927).
20. But even definitions sometimes must be defined. For example,
an atom is defined as one Qf the hypothetical indivisible parts of
which all matter is supposed to be formed. This definition has
little meaning to a person who does, not know the meaning of
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an ability to ascertain the character and purpose of the
particular proceeding. This can be done only if civil and
criminal contempt are separately treated in the pre-trial
phase of the proceedings. For example, the prayer for re-
lief should be in its nature either remedial or vindicative;
the pleadings should state the nature of the action; and the
title of civil contempt proceedings should be different from
those for criminal contempt. Such requirements would be
easily satisfied and would determine conclusively the nature
of the proceeding. Compliance with such requirements would,
at the earliest stage of the action,. inform the courts of the
character and nature of a particular proceeding. This would
enable the trial court to properly determine the consequences
of the distinction; e.g., does the defendant have a right against
self-incrimination in the particular proceeding before the
court. The failure to develop and rigidly adhere to such
requirements has led to the adoption of numerous but seldom
conclusive tests, discussed below, as well as resulting in con-
fusion between tests and consequences of the distinction.
Title of Proceeding
Apart from the inconclusiveness of the tests, some of
them would be effective as procedural requirements if a
rigid compliance were demanded. Some courts hold that
the title of the proceeding aids in determining whether the
contempt is civil or criminal. In Gompers v. Buk Stove and
Range Co.21 the Supreme Court pointed out that a civil con-
tempt proeceding is between the original parties and is in-
stituted as a part of the original action; but criminal con-
tempt proceedings are between the state and the defendant
and are not a part of the original atcion. But in Nye v.
United States,22 the Supreme Court held that this test was
not decisive. In that case, although the title of the pro-
ceeding, except on appeal, was the same as in the original
"matter." Thus, the real utility of this definition of civil and
criminal contempt depends largely upon an ability to ascertain
the purpose of the particular contempt proceeding. This often is
not easy.
21. 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1910); see Parker v. U.S. 153 F.2d 66, 70
(C.C.A. 1st 1946); Bradstreet v. Bradstreet Collection Bureau,
249 Fed. 958, 960 (C.C.A. 2d 1918); Department of Health of
New Jersey v. Borough of Ft. Lee, 108 N.J. Eq. 139, 154 Atl.319 (1931).
22. 313 U.S. 33, 42 (1940).
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action, the Court concluded that the defendant was prose-
cuted for a criminal contempt. In Denny v. State,23 the
leading Indiana decision on this subject, the court, after an
extensive survey of the problems created by this distinction,
stated several conclusions, among which was "that the infor-
mation for a criminal contempt should be entitled State of
Indiana v. the defendant ... (and) that a proceeding for
a civil contempt should be filed in the civil case out of which
it arises. '" 2'
Prosecuting Parties
Another test is the requirement in some jurisdictions
that civil contempt cases be prosecuted by the parties and
that prosecution of criminal contempt cases be conducted by
state officials. 25  It has been stated of this test that its
value is enhanced by "the fact its application is exceptionally
easy and also because it is available at the very beginning
of the proceeding." 2r This, of course, is equally true of the
preceeding title test.
The application of this test in Indiana is not clear. In
one case a private person was permitted to prosecute a crim-
inal contempt proceeding. 27  Subsequently, a dictum in the
Denny case indicated that the "who is the plaintiff" test
would be followed.28  It has been suggested that the rule
in Indiana is that the state is a "proper" but not a "neces-
sary" party to a criminal contempt proceeding. 29
At one time the requirement that a private person prose-
cute civil contempt cases caused some difficulty where the
United States or its agents were complaining parties in the
contempt proceedings. Thus, it was held that the Federal
Trade Commission had no power to commence civil contempt
23. 203 Ind. 682, 182 N.E. 313 (1932).
24. Id. at 707, 182 N.E. at 321.
25. McCann v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211, 214 (C.C.A. 2d
1935); Wakefield v. Hansel, 288 Fed. 712, 715 (C.C.A. 8th
1923); McCauley v. First Trust and Savings Bank, 276 Fed.
117 (C.C.A. 7th 1921); Denny v. State, 203 ind. 682, 706, 182
N.E. 313, 321 (1932); In re Whitmore, 9 Utah 441, 35 Pac. 524(1841).
26. Moskovitz, "Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal" 43
Col. L. Rev. 780, 787 (1943).
27. Oakland Coal Co. v. Wilson, 196 Ind. 501, 149 N.E. 54 (1924).
28. Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 706, 182 N.E. 313, 321 (1932).
29. Moskovitz, "Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal" 43
Col. L. Rev. 780, 810, n. 139 (1943).
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proceedings since it represented a public, not a private,
interest.30 This holding was squarely repudiated one year
later when the Supreme Court stated that "the mere presence
of the United States as a party, acting through its agents,
does not impress upon the controvery the elements of a crim-
inal proceeding."81 Subsequent cases have also affirmed the
power of administrative agencies to bring civil contempt pro-
ceedings.3 2 Notably, however, one distinction will probably
be made between civil contempt proceedings brought by an
administrativ agency and those brought by private persons.
As shall be seen, a plaintiff in a civil contempt proceeding
may be awarded a compensatory fine. It seems unlikely that
such a fine would be awarded to an administrative agency.
It is much more likely that an administrative agency will
seek only to have the defendant coerced into compliance where
that is possible.3 8
Payment of Fine
There is also a "to whom is the fine paid" test. In a
civil contempt proceeding, a fine may be awarded to the
complainant which is in its nature compensatory.34 It will
usually include actual loss, 5 plus the expenses of prosecuting
the action, 8 and may include profits lost because of the con-
tumacious conduct.8 7  But in New York a statute permits
30. Federal Trade Commission v. A. McLean and Son, 94 F.2d 802(C.C.A. 7th 1938).
31. McCrone v. U.S., 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939).
32. Penfield Co. of California v. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, 330 U.S. 585 (1947); National Labor Relations Board
v. Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.2d 725 (C.C.A. 5th 1941); National
Labor Relations Board v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 104 F.2d
302 (C.C.A. 2d 1939).
33. But cf. U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) where
the government obtained damages for civil contempt.
34. Moore v. Sanitary Milk Co., 209 Ind. 558, 570, 200 N.E. 228,
233 (1936); Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 707, 182 N.E. 313,
321 (1932); see cases in notes 35, 36, and 37.
35. Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 110 (1922); Matter of
Christenson Engineering Co., 194, U.S.- 458, 459 (1904); Parker
v. U.S., 153 F.2d 66 (C.A.A. 1st 1946); Ashby v. Ashby, 62
N.J. Eq. 618, 50 Atl. 473 (1910); City of Scranton v. People's
Coal Co., 274 Pa. 63, 117 AtI. 673 (1922).
36. Norstrom v. Wall, 41 F.2d 920 (C.C.A. 7th 1930); Campbell v.
Motion Picture Machine Operators, 151 Minn. 238, 186 N.W. 787(1922); Hilton v. Hilton, 89 N.J. Eq. 422, 105 At. 65 (1918)(relying on statute); Clark v. Barnes, 76 N.Y. 294 (1879).
37. Freeman v. Premier Machine Co., 25 F. Supp. 927, 928 (Mass.
1928). For an analysis of the accounting methods used in com-
puting the amount of the fine, see John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen
L. Stetson Co., 58 F. Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
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the imposition of a fine though no loss or injury is shown.8
In view of the character of civil contempt fine and its pay-
ment to the complainant, it is, as observed by one court, 8
more in the nature of a tort judgment of money damages
awarded for the defendant's wrongful conduct. A conditional
fine in civil contempt proceedings may be imposed for the
purpose of coercing the defendant into compliance with the
court order.40 Upon compliance, the duty to pay the fine
is excused. 1
In criminal contempt cases the fine is punitive and is
paid to the public treasury.42 Such fines must not be un-
reasonable, 43 but this does not mean that they must be small.
In one case a fine of $250,000 was imposed44 and in the
United Mine Workers case the unconditional fine against the
union was $700,000 and the conditional fine was $2,800,000.45
The Nye case also held this "to whom is the fine paid"
test to be inconclusive.46 Moreover, in three Supreme Court
cases a fine was made payable in part to the complainant
and in part to the Government.47 The coup de grace was ad-
ministered in the United Mine Workers case to the con-
clusiveness of this test in the federal courts. Though in
assessing this fine the Court thought that it should consider
38. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 773.
39. Parker v. U.S., 153 F. 2d 66, 71 (C.C.A. lst 1946).
40. U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Doyle v.
London Guaranty Co., 204 U.S. 599 (1907); Ex parte Rowland,
104 U.S. 604 (1881).
41. See cases in n. 40.
42. Parker v. U.S., 153 F.2d 66, 70 (C.C.A. 1st 1946); Oakland
Coal Co. v. Wilson, 196 Ind. 501, 149 N.E. 54 (1925); Limerick v.
Riback, 204 Mo. App. 321, 224 S.W. 45 (1920); Eastern Concrete
Steel Co. v. B. and M. I. Union, 193 N.Y.S. 368, 370 (App. Div.
4th Dept. 1922).
43. Freeman v. Premier Machine Co., 25 F. Supp. 927, 928 (Mass.
1938); Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators, 151 Minn.
238, 186 N.W. 787 (1922); Hilton v. Hilton, 89 N.J. Eq. 422, 105
Atl. 65 (1918).
44. City of Scranton v. Peoples Coal Co., 274 Pa. 63, 117 Atl. 673(1922).
45. U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 305 (1947).
46. Nye v. U.S., 313 U.S. 33, 42 (1940).
47. Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107 (1922); In re Merchant'sStock and Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639 (1912); Matter of Christenson
Engineering Co 194 U.S. 458 (1904). The inapplicability of this
test is further Aemonstrated by State ex rel Chicago, B. and Q.
Ry. v. Bland, 189 Mo. 197, 88 S.W. 28 (1905) where the fine was
made payable, neither to the complainant nor to the government,
but to the public schools.
1948]
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the magnitude of the harm done, the probable effectiveness
of any suggested sanction, the amount of the defendant's
resources, and the consequent seriousness of the burden to
the particular defendant, it is impossible to say which of these
considerations applied to the civil contempt fine and which
applied to the criminal contempt fine. The Court did not
say how much of the fine was for civil contempt and how
much was for criminal contempt. Since both of the pro-
ceedings were tried together and since the Government was
the complainant in both proceedings, the utility of this test
was nil.
Characteristics of Imprisonment
In addition to the treatment of fines differently, there is
a distinction between imprisonment for civil contempt and
imprisonment for criminal contempt. Imprisonment for civ-
il contempt is intended to be coercive and is usually for an
indefinite period of time.48 The defendant remains in jail
until he complies with the order--"he carries the keys of his
prison in his own pocket. '1 9 This is ordinarily a very per-
suasive remedy, though sometimes a person may be disposed
to think otherwise; for example, an Illinois woman preferred
to remain in jail several years rather than comply with a
court order.' On the other hand, imprisonment for criminal
contempt is for a definite period and is intended to be puni-
tive, not coercive.1
48. Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1910);
Parker v. U.S., 153 F.2d 66, 70 (C.C.A. 1st 1946); Raymoor
Ballroom Co. v. Buck, 110 F.2d 207, 212 (C.C.A. 1st 1940);
Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 707, 182 N.E. 313, 321 (1932);
Markle v. Local Union, 131 N.J. Eq. 202, 208, 24 A.2d 364, 367
(1942); Sullivan, 137 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Tenn. App. 1939).
Compare Dahl v. Dahl, 210 Minn. 361, 298 N.W. 361 (1941) (def-
inite sentence of 30 days imposed in civil contempt case) with
Paulson v. Johnson, 214 Minn. 202, 203, 7 N.W.2d 338, 339 (1943)(imprisonment for definite term used to show that this case in-
volved a criminal contempt). This rule has been modified by
statute in some states. See Ala. Code (1940) tit. 13, § 19; Wis.
Stat. (1943) § 295.16.
49. In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 451 (C.C.A. 8th 1902).
50. Tetgmeyer v. Tetgmeyer, 292 Ill. App. 434, 11 N.E.2d 657 (1937).
This case is criticised in Moskovitz, "Contempt of Injunctions,
Civil and Criminal" 43 Col. L. Rev. 780, 802, n. 95 (1943).
51. Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1910);
Parker v. U.S., 153 F.2d 66, 70 (C.C.A. 1st 1946); The Nave-
mar, 17 F. Supp. 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1936); Passaic-Athena Bus
Co. v. Consolidated Bus Co., 100 N.J. Eq. 188, 135 Atl. 282 (1926).
Contra: Blair v. U.S., 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
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Negative Order Test
Some courts have adopted a negative order test; thus,
where a court enjoins the performance of an act, a violation
of that order can only be criminal contempt, especially where
it is impossible to restore the status quo.52 Since civil con-
tempt is frequently considered a coercive remedy, the courts
reason that they cannot coerce a defendant into undoing what
he has done. This reasoning overlooks the fact that money
damages customarily are substitued in those situations where
a person has sustained an injury and it is impossible to
retore the status quo; e.g., wrongful death cases. There is
no valid reason why the violation of a negative order may not
be civil contempt and that the judgment be for money dam-
ages. In Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Tampa Southern R.R.,53
the defendant was enjoined from using a railroad spur. Hav-
ing violated the injunction, contempt proceedings were com-
menced. Applying this test, it was held that this could only
be criminal contempt. This case clearly illustrates why this
test is a poor one. Instead of imprisonment until compliance
with the court order, which was impossible, the court need
only have imposed a fine payable to the complainant. There
is an additional reason for rejecting this test. Most court
orders can be'worded either affirmatively or negatively. An
inadvertent choice of the negative form would preclude sub-
sequent liability for civil contempt if this test is applied, thus
denying the injured party the aid from a court which he
may justly seek.
Limerick v. Riback"5 demonstrates another evil of this
test. A negative order was issued. The court recognized that
the violation of that order could not be civil contempt, re-
lying on the negative order test; consequently, the court
held that the defendant was guilty of criminal contempt.
The court conceded that there was no evidence of intentional
conduct, but concluded that "gross negligence" would sup-
port the conviction. Generally, there must be wilfulness to
support a conviction for criminal contempt.55 The court's
52. Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 443 (1910);
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904); Phillips v.
Welch, 11 Nev. 187 (1876); State v. Knight, 3 S.D. 509, 54 N.W.
412 (1893).
53. 101 Fla. 468, 134 So. 529 (1931).
54. 204 Mo. App. 321, 224 S.W. 45 (1920).
55. Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 707, 182 N.E. 313, 321 (1932);
Pawlowski v. City of Schnectady, 217 N.Y. 117, 111 N.E. 478
(1916); State v. Highsmith, 105 S.C. 505, 90 S.E. 154 (1916).
19481
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
conclusion that gross negligence was adequate is clearly un-
desirable and it is submitted that the negative order test
was responsible for the conclusion.
The Indiana Supreme Court properly rejected the neg-
ative order test in the Denny case when the court concluded
"That the intent of the alleged contemnor distinguishes a
criminal contempt from a mere violation of an order of in-
junction; and, consequently, criminal and civil contempts
cannot be distinguished by, the test of whether the conduct
of the defendant consists in refusing to do an act required
by an order of the court or in doing an act prohibited by
the order of the court, since one may as flagrantly defy the
authority of a court by refusing to do an act enjoined, as by
doing an act forbidden by an order of the court."5 ,
Despite this criticism, there is one speical situation in
which the application of the test would work no great harm.
That situation arises when an administrative agency issues
a negative order. As already noted, in civil contempt, im-
prisonment is designed to coerce the defendant into obedi-
ence, the release from jail depending upon compliance. When
a negative order is issued, coercion to secure compliance is
impossible-the defendant cannot undo what he has already
done. Therefore, in such a situation the only civil contempt
relief available to an administrative agency would be dam-
ages; however, such agencies do not ordinarily seek damages.
Thus, by applying the negative order test here, no substantial
harm results since the agency is not deprived of any relief
that it would otherwise obtain.5" Of course, the criminal
contempt penalties are still available.
Argument of Counsel and Prayer for Relief
Occasionally, a court may look to the argument of coun-
sel to determine the nature of the contempt proceeding. In
The Navemar5 8 the court relied in part on the argument of
counsel to decide that the case involved a criminal contempt
56. Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 707, 182 N.E. 313, 321 (1932).
57. See Moskovitz, "Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal"
43 Col. L. Rev. 780, 813 (1943).
58. 17 F. Supp. 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1935). See U.S. v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 297 (1947) ("And in argument on the
motion the defendants stated and were expressly informed that
a criminal contempt was to be tried").
[Vol. 23
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proceeding. But in another case,5 9 the court refused to do
this, stating "We will not take cognizance of equivocal re-
marks made by court or by counsel in the course of the case."
Similarly, the courts have sometimes looked to the prayer for
relief, keeping in mind the remedial aspect of civil and the
vindicating aspect of criminal contempt. 0
Defeneses
As previously observed, sometimes the courts .treat these
tests as the bases of the distinction and sometimes as the
consequences of the distinction. But there are some conse-
quences which ordinarily are not considered or applied as
tests. The nature of the contempt proceeding will affect
the defenses available. Good faith may mitigate the penalty
in criminal8' but not in civil62 contempt. Although usually
a defendant may be pardoned by the executive for criminal
contempt6 3 but not for civil contempt,64 in Indiana the execu-
tive has no power to pardon for criminal contempt.
6 5
Indiana follows the rule that a defendant in a criminal
contempt proceeding is entitled to a discharge upon his ver-
ified answer if the answer is sufficient to show lack of
intent to defy the authority of the court.66 This defense,
obviating the necessity of introducing evidence, is generally
not approved in the United States and has been severely crit-
icised.67 As with the application of the negative order test,
this defense has led the courts to reach undesireable results.
In Locrasto v. State,68 in order to hold that the verified an-
59. National Popsicle Corp. v. Kroll, 104 F.2d 259, 260 (C.C.A. 2d
1939).
60. McCann v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211 (C.C.A. 2d 1935);
Kelley v. Montbello Park, 141 Md 194, 118 AtI. 600 (1922);
Hanna v. State ex rel Rice, 169 Miss. 314, 153 So. 371 (1934).
61. Eustace v. Lynch, 80 F.2d 652, 656 (C.C.A. 9th 1935).
62. Proudfit Loose Leaf Co. v. Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder Co.,
230 Fed. 120, 132 (C.C.A. 6th 1916).
63. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925); In re Nevitt, 117 Fed.
448 (C.C.A. 8th 1902).
64. Rivers v. Miller, 31 F. Supp. 540, 546 (M.D. Ga. 1940); see
In re Opinion of the Justices, 301 Mass. 615, 621, 17 N.E.2d
906, 911 (1938); Rex v. Rodman, Cro, Car. 198, 79 Eng. Rep.
139 (1676).
65. State v. Schumaker, 200 Ind. 716, 164 N.E. 408 (1928).
66. Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 707, 182 N.E. 313, 321 (1932). But
cf. Dale v. State of Indiana, 198 Ind. 110, 150 N.E. 781 (1926).
67. Curtis and Curtis, "The Story of a Notion in The Law of Crim-
inal Contempt" 41 Harv. L. Rev. 51 (1927).
68. 202 Ind. 277, 173 N.E. 456 (1930),
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swer was not an adequate defense, the court held that the
case involved a civil contempt proceeding; yet, by an appli-
cation of many of the tests previously considered, this would
have been a criminal contempt proceeding: a determinate
sentence was imposed, a fine was made payable to the state,
the case was entitled in the name of the state, and the case
was prosecuted by state officials.
Evidence
In some respects different rules of eivdence are applied.
In a criminal contempt proceeding, the defendant cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself89 but may in civil
contempt proceedings." In criminal contempt the defend-
ant is presumed to be innocent7 and the quantum of proof
required is beyond a reasonable doubt.7 2 A determination that
a defendant is guilty of civil contempt need not be supported
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt;7 3 however, the courts
are not uniform in the quantum of proof required; e.g.,
some require that the proof in civil contempt cases be clear
and convincing 74 and other courts only require a preponder-
ance of the evidence to sustain the holding.76
Settlement
Where there has been a change of circumstances sub-
69. Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1910);
Parker v. U.S., 153 F.2d 66 (C.C.A. 1st 1946)h; State ex rel
Dailey v. Dailey, 164 Wash. 140, 2 P.2d 79 (1931).
70. American Pastry Products Corp. v. United Products Corp., 39 F.2d
181 (Mass. 1930); Root v. McDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N.E.
684 (1927); State ex rel Baker Lodge No. 47 v. Sieber, 49 Ore.
1, 88 Pac. 313 (1907).
71. Parker v. U.S., 153 F.2d 66 (C.C.A. 1st 1946); Eastern Fruit
Growers v. Gottfried, 136 F.2d 98 (C.C.A. 9th 1943); In re United
Hatters of North America, 110 N.J. Eq. 42, 158 Atl. 435 (1932);
State ex rel Anderson v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 191 S.W.
974 (1916).
72. Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1910);
Parker v. U.S., 153 F.2d 66 (C.C.A. 1st 1946); Eastern Fruit
Growers v. Gottfried, 136 F.2d 98 (C.C.A. 9th 1943); Root v.
McDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N.E. 684 (1927); State ex rel
Anderson v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 191 S.W. 974 (1916).
73. Coca Cola Co. v. Feuler, 7 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1934); State
v. Frolich, 316 Ill. 77, 146 N.E. 733 (1935).
74. Telling v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 77 F.2d 584 (C.C.A. 6th
1935); Coca Cola Co. v. Feuler, 7 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1934);
Morgan v. National Bank of Commerce, 90 Okla. 280, 217 Pac.
388 (1923).
75. State v. Frolich, 316 Ill. 77, 146 N.E. 733 (1935); People v.
Buconich, 270 Ill. 290, 115 N.E. 185 (1917).
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sequent to the issuance of the order, liability for contempt
may depend upon the nature of the proceeding. A settlement
between the parties in the main cause, said the Supreme
Court in the Gompers case, would preclude liability for civil
contempt, but that "if this had been ... criminal contempt
to vindicate the authority of the court . . . it could not in
any way have been affected by any settlement which the
parties to the equity cause made in their private litigation." 7
The purpose of civil contempt is remedial. After a settle-
ment, the complainant would not be entitled to any remedy
for the violation of an injunction. But since the purpose of
criminal contempt is to vindicate the authority of the court,
a settlement could .not affect that purpose.
Improvidently Issued Order
The violation of an order erroneously issued has given
rise to prolific litigation involving the distinction between
civil and criminal contempt. When an order is subsequently
reversed on appeal, there is no civil contempt liability for a
violation of the order occurring prior to the reversal.77 This
is because a party not entitled to the benefit of a court order
can suffer no legal consequences as a result of its violation.
The theory of civil contempt is that it is to remedy a wrong
done. It would seem, then, that a person could violate the
order with impunity and without resorting to legal processes
to have the order reversed. Although such a procedure is
condoned, it would seem wiser to file a bill of review to
have the order vacated.7 8  From the viewpoint of counseling
it would be wiser to obey the order until it is reversed be-
cause the party would not only bear the risk of an affirm-
ance of the validity of the order, but such conduct, if in-
tentional, would constitute criminal contempt.7 9  The subse-
76. Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1910).
77. Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp.,
86 F.2d 727 (1936); Newton Rubber Works v. De Las Casas,
198 Mass. 156, 84 N.E. 119 (1908); Red River Potato Growers
Assoc. v. Bernardy, 128 Minn. 153, 150 N.W. 383 (1915); Kaehler
v. Dobberpuhl, 56 Wis. 497, 14 N.W. 631 (1883).
78. See Newton Rubber Works v. De Las Casas, 84 N.E. 119, 120
(Mass. 1908).
79. Merrimac River Savings Bank v. Clay Center, 219 U.S. 527
(1911); Securities Exchange Commission v. 0kin, 137 F.2d
862, 863 (C.C.A. 2d 1943); Ex parte Fortenbury, 38 Cal. App.2d
284, 101 P.2d 105 (1940); Lyon and Healy v. Piano 0. and
M.I.W. International Union, 289 Ill. 176, 124 N.E. 443 (1919);
Red River Potato Growers Assoc. v. Bernardy, 128 Minn. 153,
130 N.W. 383 (1915); State v. Nathan, 49 S.C. 199, 27 S.E. 52
(1897).
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quent reversal of the order would not excuse liability for
criminal contempt but could be considered in mitigation of
the penalty. 80 The spirited attitude of the courts in this
matter is forcefully stated in an early English case: "It
is not open to any party to question the orders of this
court, or any process issued under the authority of this
court, by disobedience. I know of no act which this court
may do which may not be questioned in a proper form and
on a proper application; but I am of the opinion that it is
not competent for anyone . . . to disobey an injunction or
any other order of the court on the ground that such orders
were improvidently made . . . I consider the rule to be of
such importance to the interests and safety of the public
and to the due administration of justice that it ought, on
all occasions, to be inflexibly maintained.""' Another court
has thought this was the only way to maintain law and order.82
It is not for the defendant to flout the processes of the courts
according to his own notion of his rights. It is not for him
to decide whether the order was valid or not. Even the
violation of an order erroneously issued is an affront to the
authority of the court, and it is the duty of the court to
vindicate its authority, no matter how ill advised was the
issuance of the order.
III. SEPARATE OR COMBINED PROCEEDINGS
"It may not always be easy to classify a particular act
as belonging to either one of these two classes... (since) ...
it may partake of the characteristics of both."'s Indeed,
80. Shuler v. Raton Waterworks, 247 Fed. 634, 638 (C.C.A. 8th
1917); Cape May and S.L. R.R. v. Johnson, 35 N.J. Eq. 422,
425 (1882); Sullivan v. Judah, 4 Paige (N.Y.) 444, 447 (1834);
Russel v. East Anglian R.R., 3 Mac. and G. 104, 42 Eng. Rep.
201 (1850).
81. Russel v. East Anglian R.R., 3 Mac. and G. 104, 117, 42 Eng. Rep.
201, 206 (1850). In the United States, the courts state the prop-
osition as follows: "An injunction or restraining order must be
obeyed until vacated or modified by the court awarding it or
by superior authority or until the order or decree which granted
it has been reversed on appeal, no matter how unreasonable and
unjust the decree may be in its terms and no matter how flag-
rantly the rules of equity have been violated by the court in order-
ing it to issue." Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Tampa Southern R.R.,
134 So. 529, 533 (Fla. 1931).
82. Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Priess, 140 N.E. 793, 794
(Mass. 1923).
83. Bessette v.. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904); Bangs
v. Northern Indiana Power Co., 211 Ind. 628, 636, 6 N.E.2d 563,
566 (1937).
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every civil contempt, if an intentional violation, is an affront
to the authority of the court, thus constituting also a crim-
inal contempt. There is nothing unique about this. Assault
and battery not only makes a person liable in a civil action,
but, in certain circumstances, also constitutes a violation of
the criminal law. Where contumacious conduct does con-
stitute both civil and criminal contempt, it would seem that,
as in the case of assault and battery, separate proceedings
would be required.
But in the Unite-d Mine Workers case, evidently influ-
enced by the convenience of the procedure, the Supreme Court
held that civil and criminal contempt proceedings could be
tried together.84 In reaching this conclusion, it was necessary
for the Court to interpret Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure 5  This rule requires that notice of
the proceedings describe them as criminal. Justice Rutledge
in his dissent stated that he thought that Rule 42 (b) required
separate proceedings.8 6 Although the Rule does not specific-
ally require separate proceedings, such an inference would be
reasonable and proper. Although there was an obvious non-
compliance with the rule, the Court refused to make a "rig-
ourous" interpretation of it, stating that the defendants sus-
tained no prejudice by the noncompliance. 7  The Court ex-
pressed the opinion that the defendants were adequately in-
formed of the nature of the charge. Justice Rutledge's dis-
sidence with the combined procedure is exemplified by the
following language: "In any other context than one of con-
84. U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 299 (1947).
85. Fed. R. Crim. P., 42 (b) : "Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing.
A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of
this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the
time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts con-
stituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such.
The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in
the presence of the defendant, or on the application of the United
States Attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for
that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order to arrest.
The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which
an Act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to
bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves
disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified'
from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defend-
ant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall
enter an order fixing the punishment."
86. U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 372, especially n.
45 (1947).
87. Id. at 297.
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tempt, the idea that a criminal prosecution and a civil suit
for damages or equitable relief could be hashed together in
a single criminal-civil hodgepodge would be shocking to
every American lawyer and to most citizens." 88
In McCann v. New York Stock Exchange,89 Judge Learn-
ed Hand, speaking for the court, held that unless the defend-
ant was advised that the proceeding was for criminal con-
tempt, then the court would deem the proceeding to be for
civil contempt. Rule 42(b) was adopted because of this
holding.9 ° Since the defendant had not been advised that
this was a criminal contempt proceeding, the court held the
proceeding to be civil contempt. It is worthy of note that
in this case there was filed a notice of a motion for an
order "punishing the defendant for contempt of court through
wilful violation" of the injunction.91 The notice in the Mc-
Cann cas.e was as informative to that defendant as to the
nature of the charge as were the factors relied upon in the
United Mine Workers case.9 2 A different result was reached
because the court in the McCann case adopted a "rigorous"
interpretation of its own requirement. Even before the
McCann case and twenty-seven years before the United Mine
Workers case, the Supreme Court had stated that "due pro-
cess of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except
of that committed in open court, requires that the accused
should be advised of the charges.
'1 3
Such a combined proceeding in Indiana would not be
permitted. In the Denny case, the court stated "that even
though a single act of disobedience of an order of injunction
may constitute both a criminal and civil contempt, a pro-
ceeding in contempt for enforcement of civil rights and rem-
edies is legally as independent of a criminal proceeding as a
civil action for assault and battery is independent of a crim-
inal prosecution based upon the same facts."94  This is
really the only sound conclusion. Innumerable difficulties
88. Id. at 364.
89. 80 F.2d 215 (C.C.A. 2d 1935).
90. United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Notes to the Rules (March, 1945) at p. 34.
91. McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 215, 217 (C.C.A.
2d 1935).
92. See U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 297 (1947).
93. Cooke v. U.S., 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
94. Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 707, 182 N.E. 313, 321 (1932).
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which apparently did not arise in the United Mine Workers
case would be sure to arise in other combined proceedings for
civil and criminal contempt. For example, in a combined
proceeding should the defendant be compelled to be a witness
against himself? In a single proceeding should the state
prosecute one action and a private party another? Under
Rule 42(b) sometimes a jury trial is permitted in criminal
cases. In such a case, in a single proceeding, would it be
feasible to have a jury trying the criminal contempt and the
court trying the civil contempt? From the viewpoint of
expediency and convenience a negative answer to these
questions is patent.
However, there would be no prejudice to constitutional
rights since such rights theoretically can be safeguarded even
in a single proceeding. For example, in a civil proceeding
both legal and equitable issues may be litigated, the legal
issues being tried by a jury and the equitable issue being
tried by court. Manifestly, constitutional rights are ade-
quately protected in such a proceeding. It might be con-
cluded that such an example demonstrates the expediency
of a combined proceeding. But, clearly, this is distinguish-
able from the contempt problem. In the example given the
legal and equitable issues are separate; therefore, it is im-
possible to get two different results on any given issue.
However, in a civil and criminal contempt proceeding, some of
the issues may be the same; e.g., did the defendant violate the
order? Conceivably, a jury might reach an affirmative
answer in a criminal contempt proceeding and the court reach
a negative answer in a civil contempt proceeding. Further,
in the civil and criminal contempt cases, differences of bur-
den of proof, self incrimination, and quantum of evidence
are involved; while in a case involving both equitable and
legal issues, the only difference pertains to the right to trial
by jury.
The interpretation of Rule 42(b) is unfortunate. It
has been stated in reference to the decision of the lower court
in the United Mine Workers case that "this is not the first
time that judicial action had responded to impelling con-
siderations of public need, and it is safe to assume that
it will not be the last."'9  The prophecy was accurate. Al-
95. Note, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 469, 508 (1947).
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though the same source stated "the Supreme Court . . .can
now consider the legal questions involved in an atmosphere
freed of the tension which was present when the strike was
still on,' '06 it sems more realistic so far as the interpretation
of Rule 42(b) is concerned to say that judicial action once
again "responded to impelling considerations of public need."
It seems reasonable to expect that the Supreme Court will
confine its sanction of the combined proceeding in the United
Mine Workers case to the facts of the case. Rule 42(b)
still has some efficacy in that, even as interpreted, the de-
fendant must not be prejudiced by a failure to notify him that
the proceeding is one for criminal contempt. Under the facts
in the case, this means at least that the defendant must have
actual knowledge of the nature of the proceeding.
IV. THE EFFECT OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
A consequence of the distinction between civil and crim-
inal contempt which deserves separate consideration is pre-
sented by the violation of an order void for lack of juris-
diction. It seems clear that the violation of such an order
issued without juridiction would not be civil contempt. Since
the complainant would not be entitled to the benefit of the
order, he can have suffered no legal damages. A substantial
number of cases hold this also is not criminal contempt.Y'
In the United Mine Workers case, the Supreme Court
stated that even if the District Court did not have jurisdic-
tion under the Norris-La Guardia Act to issue the order,
the defendant would be guilty of criminal"" but not civil"
contempt. Justice Frankfurter took the position that the
District Court did not have jurisdiction, but he also joined
in affirming the conviction of criminal contempt.100
Traditionally, any action taken by a court which did
not have jurisdiction has been considered void, not merely
voidable. From a policy point of view, the disregard of it
96.. Ibid.
97. Ex parte Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S.
713 (1885); Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 (1881); Beauchamp
v. U.S., 76 F.2d 663 (C.C.A. 9th 1935); Abbott v. Eastern Mass.
St. Ry., 16 F.2d 463 (C.C.A. 1st 1927); Old Dominion Telegraph
Co. v. Powers, 140 Ala. 220, 37 So. 195 (1904); Hoffman v.
State, 207 Ind. 695, 194 N.E. 331 (1935).
98. U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 254, 294 (1947).
99. Id. at 295.
100. Id. at 311.
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by the Court in this type of case is certainly justified, since
in such cases the choice is between order and disorder. Our
law provides an orderly process of review and contemplates
the use of such process so that courts, and not individuals,
should determine whether or not a given order is or is not
properly issued. As stated by Justice Brewer in In Re
Debs,'10 "It is a lesson which cannot be learned too soon or
too thoroughly that under this government by and for the
people the means of redress of all wrong are through the
court and the ballot box, and that no wrong carries with it
legal warant to invite as a means of redress"'1 2 nonjudicial
action.
The conclusion that the defendants in the United Mine
Workers case were guilty of criminal contempt even if the
district court did not have jurisdiction was based primarily
upon United States v. Shipp10 3 In that case, an appeal from
an order denying a petition for habeas corpus was taken to
the Supreme Court. The order allowing the appeal also
ordered that all proceedings against the defendant be stayed
and that the custody of the defendant be retained pending the
appeal. Shipp, who was the sheriff, of the county where
the defendant was confined, was notified of this order. Sub-
sequently the defendant was lynched and Shipp was charged
with criminal contempt for the violation of that part of
the order requiring the defendant be retained in custody.
In the contempt proceeding, Shipp maintained that he was
permitted to violate this order with impunity because the
order allowing the appeal was void for want of jurisdiction.
In holding the defendant guilty of criminal contempt, Justice
Holmes stated the rule as follows: "It has been held, it is
true, that orders made by a court having no jurisdiction to
make them may be disregarded without liability to process
for contempt." (At this point the opinion cited Ex parte
Sawyer, Ex parte Rowland, and Ex parte Fisk, discussed
below.) "But even ... if this court had no jurisdiction...
this court and this court alone could decide that such was
the law. It and it alone necessarily had jurisdiction to decide
101. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
102. Id. at 598.
103. 203 U.S. 563 (1906). For another, consideration of this case in
which the author argues that it is not applicable to the United
Mine Workers case, see Watt, "The Divine Right of Government
By Judiciary" 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 409, 436 (1947).
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whether the case was properly before it... Until its judg-
ment declining jurisdiction should be announced, it had au-
thority from the necessity of the case to make orders to pre-
serve existing conditions."'10 Thus, since a court had juris-
diction to decide whether or not it has jurisdiction of the
main cause in a particular proceeding, it may issue orders
necessary to preserve existing conditions until that issue can
be decided; and the validity of the issuance of such orders is
in no way dependent upon the ultimate determination of
the jurisdictional issue. It would seem then, that so long as
those orders were issued to preserve existing conditions, juris-
diction to issue those orders was absolute, although it might
be ultimately determined that the court did not have juris-
diction over the main cause. Further, the violation of orders
issued to preserve existing conditions would constitute crim-
inal contempt in spite of the subsequent determination that
the court had no jurisdiction over the main cause.
The majority and dissenting opinions were in substan-
tial disagreement as to the application of the Shipp case to
the United Mine Workers case. This would seem to be en-
tirely a matter of statutory interpretation. The issue to be
decided was whether or not the Norris-La Guardia Act was
intended to require a federal court to determine its jurisdic-
tion under the Act before it issued any restraining orders in
labor dispute cases. Neither the majority opinion nor the
concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter expressly decided
this question. For example, Justice Frankfurter did decide
that the Norris-La Guardia Act deprived the district court
of jurisdiction over the main cause, but he did not expressly
decide whether or not the Act deprived the district court
of the power to issue orders to preserve existing conditions
while it determined the application of the Norris-La Guardia
Act to the main cause. On the contrary, Justice Frankfurter
apparently assumed that the Act did not restrict the Shipp
rule to non-labor dispute cases. This apparently was the
assumption of the majority for it stated "in these circum-
stances, the District Court unquestionably had the power to
issue a restraining order for the purpose of preserving exist-
ing conditions pending a decision upon its own jurisdic-
tion."'01 ° (Italics added.)
104. U.S. v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906).
105. U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 290 (1947).
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In his dissenting opinion Justice Rutledge adopted a
more restricted interpretation of the Shipp rule by taking a
different view of the meaning of "preserving existing con-
ditions."'016 The effect of Shipp's contempt was to moot the
habeas corpus proceeding, thus depriving the Supreme Court
of jurisdiction to determine the issues in that appeal. Con-
sequently, Justice Rutledge would confine the application of
the Shipp rule to those situations where the effect of the
contempt would be to moot the main cause. The effect
of the defendant's contempt in the United Mine Workers
case did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction, since
that court, if it ever had jurisdiction to issue an injunction,
retained that jurisdiction after the violation of the restraining
order; therefore, Justice Rutledge concluded that it was not
issued to "preserve existing conditions." No doubt Justice
Rutledge was also influenced by the fact that an order which
purported to preserve existing conditions in the United Mine
Workers ease was necessarily identical to the kind of order
that would be issued if it was subsequently determined that
the district court did have jurisdiction over the main cause.
On this ground he might have concluded that the Norris-La
Guardia Act did restrict the application ot the Shipp rule to
non-labor dispute cases.
There is one federal and two state decisions which are
very similar on their facts to the United Mine Workers case.
Carter v. United States10 7 involved a conviction for criminal
contempt growing out of the violation of a labor injunction.
On appeal from the contempt conviction, it was held that
the defendant was properly convicted even if the trial court
had no jurisdiction. 08 This case was approved in the United
Mine Workers case. In Reid v. Independent Union of All
Workers0 9 and in People ex rel Sandnes v. Sheriff of King's
County,"0 a labor injunction was issued in spite of state
statutes which were models of the Norris-La Guardia Act.
After violations of these orders, contempt proceedings were
instituted. In both cases, it was contended that the lower
court had no jurisdiction. In the Sandnes case, the New
106. Id. at 395.
107. 135 F.2d 858 (C.C.A. 5th 1943).
108. The conviction was reversed on rehearing for other reasons.
109. 200 Minn. 599, 275 N.W. 300 (1937).
110. 164 Misc. 355, 299 N.Y. Supp. 9 (S.Ct. 1937).
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York court held that the trial court was without jurisdiction;
therefore, the conviction of contempt was reversed. In the
Reid case, the Minnesota court affirmed the conviction, stat-
ing "As long as nothing more infallible than human beings
can be found wherewith to implement our courts . . . juris-
diction implies, as a matter of regrettable but inescapable ne-
cessity, that jurisdiction to decide is the power to decide
erroneously as well as correctly."'"
There are three Supreme Court cases which at first seem
contrary to the United Mine Workers case. In Ex parte Saw-
yer 12 a municipal official obtained from a United States
Circuit Court an injunction restraining other municipal of-
ficials from proceeding to remove him from office. The
injunction was violated and the defendants were punished
for contempt. The Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas
corpus releasing them from imprisonment on the ground that
the circuit court was without jurisdiction to issue the injunc-
tion. The lack of jurisdiction was based upon alternate
grounds; i.e., either this was restraining a criminal proceed-
ilig; or it was an interference with a judicial proceeding of
the state; or it was an attempt to try title to a public office.
Since the circuit court had no jurisdiction, the Court con-
cluded, the injunction was void and its violation would not
be contempt. Chief Justice Waite and Justice Harlan dis-
sented on the ground that instead of lacking jurisdiction in
every such case, the most that could be said was that the
lower court had erorneously concluded that it had jurisdic-
tion in this case; therefore, the circuit court was permitted
"to enquire . . . whether the case is one that entitles the
party to the relief he asks, and, if necessary to prevent wrong
in the mean time, to issue in its discretion a temporary re-
straining order for that purpose... Such an order will not be
void, even though it may be found on examination to have
been improvidently issued. '113 The dissenting opinions thus
111. Reid v. Independent Union of All Workers, 200 Minn. 599, 601,
275 N.W. 300, 301 (1937). Both cases have been widely com-
mented upon and variously interpreted. See Notes, 18 Boston
L. Rev. 621 (1938); 51 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1938); 23 Iowa L.
Rev. 433 (1938); 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1208 (1938); 86 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 676 (1938).
112. 124 U.S. 200 (1888).
113. Id. at 223.
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seem to anticipate the Shipp rule. In Ex parte Rowland11" ' a
Circuit Court of the United States issued an order to the
defendant to levy a tax upon certain property to satisfy
the claim of a creditor and to cause this tax to be collected.
The tax was levied but the defendant did nothing to cause
the tax to be collected; consequently, the defendant was pun-
ished for contempt by fine and imprisonment. As noted
below, the fine and imprisonment were to be suspended if
the claim of the creditor was paid. The Supreme Court held
this conviction for contempt was void on the grounds that
the issuance of the order to cause the defendant to collect
the tax was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. In Ex
parte Fisk"5 a proceeding was commenced in a state court
to recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentations. Pur-.
suant to its procedure, the state court ordered the defendant
to answer, in a pre-trial procedure, interrogatories submitted
by his adversary. The proceeding was removed to a United
States Circuit Court where a similar order was issued. For
failure to comply, the defendant was punished for contempt.
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the Supreme Court held the
contempt conviction was void because the order to submit
to this examination was issued without jurisdiction.
It has been suggested that Ex parte Sawyer was a clear
case in which the question of jurisdiction was obvious.116 If
this were true, then the case might be distinguished from
the United Mine Workers case on the ground that it comes
within the limitation upon the decision in that case, discussed
below. But the distinction seems unlikely. Although today
it may appear that the court was clearly without jurisdiction
to issue the order involved in that case, at the time the de-
cision was rendered there was some reasonable doubt.117
It has been suggested that Ex parte Rowland was a -case
involving civil contempt, 18 which it is conceded would not
be sustained if the court had no jurisdiction to issue the
order that was violated. This distinction is based upon the
fact that fine and* imprisonment were to be suspended if the
114. 104 U.S. 604 (1881).
115. 113 U.S. 713 (1885).
116. Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 749 (1938).
117. The dissenting opinions demonstrate that the question was clearly
not obvious.
118. Carter v. U.S., 135 F.2d 858, 861 (C.C.A. 5th 1943).
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defendants complied with the order. This is a characteristic
of civil contempt and the distinction would seem justified
if the court had treated the case as one for civil contempt;
however, no distinction was made between civil and criminal
contempt.
These cases can be distinguished from the United Mine
Workers case on the same ground that Justice Holmes ap-
parently had in mind in the Shipp case. In neither the
Sawyer, Rowland, nor the Fisk cases was a preliminary order
issued for the purpose of preserving existing conditions
while the court determined its own jurisdiction. In fact,
only the order in the main cause was issued. This distinc-
tion is based upon the conclusion that the Shipp rule was
properly applied in the United Mine Workers case. If this
conclusion is erroneous, then some other basis for the United
Mine Workers decision must be formulated. Should that
basis be, as in the case of improvidently issued orders, that
private individuals must resort to orderly processes of re-
view, or else be subject to criminal contempt penalties, then
these three cases would be inconsistent with the United Mine
Workers case.
In addition to the requirement that the order be issued
to preserve existing conditions, the Court recognized an-
other limitation upon the view that it would be criminal
contempt to violate a void order. It was stated that a "dif-
ferent result would follow were the question of jurisdiction
frivolous and not substantial." 119  A keener insight into the
meaning of this limitation is found in the words of Justice
Frankfurter: "Only when a court is so obviously traveling
outside its orbit as to be merely usurping judicial forms and
facilities may an order issued by a court be disobeyed and
treated as though it were a letter to a newspaper.1' '12 It is
doubtful if this limitation is substantial since courts seldom
act with such an obvious lack of jurisdiction; yet, this limi-
tation is in form a restriction upon the Shipp rule. Further,
it may provide a cue for Congress. A simple course for
Congress to follow in order to avoid the result reached in
the United Mine Workers case, if that is desireable, would
be to enact legislation restricting the Shipp rule to non-labor
dispute cases.
119. U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947).
120. Id. at 309.
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CRIMINAL VS. CIVIL CONTEMPT
V. SUMMARY
The power to punish for civil and criminal contempt "is
a necessary and integral part of the judicial power and is
absolutely essential to the performance of duties imposed by
law upon courts of equity. Without it, such courts are mere
boards of arbitration, whose decrees and judgments are only
advisory.' 1 21 Since contempt of court is so necessary to the
preservation of our courts, it is imperative that the state
of confusion arising from the distinction between civil and
criminal contempt be eliminated if possible.
The initial determination of the nature of the proceeding
should be made in the trial stage and not the appellate stage
of the proceedings. This suggests the need for the develop-
ment and rigid adherence to procedural devices. The re-
medial nature of civil contempt and the vindicating nature
of criminal contempt should be reflected in the pleadings.
The pleadings should designate the proceeding either as crim-
inal or civil contempt. The courts should tolerate no depart-
ure from this designation once made. The relief sought
should conform to the characteristic relief granted in the
particular proceeding. For example, a fine paid to both
the government and to the complainant should not be sanc-
tioned. Criminal contempt proceedings should be entitled in
the name of the state and civil contempt proceedings should
be entitled the same as the main cause. Government attor-
neys only should prosecute criminal contempt actions and
the attorneys of the private parties should prosecute civil
contempt proceedings. Of course, where the government or
its agents is the complainant in civil contempt proceedings,
an apparent exception from this rule would be necessary.
Although a departure from the requirements might not in
all cases constitute reversible error, once these rules were
made plain and clear, the trial courts would certainly endeavor
to secure compliance.
A combined civil and criminal contempt action in a
single proceeding should not be sanctioned. Innumerable dif-
ficulties have already been suggested. Although the Supreme
Court concluded that the noncompliance with Rule 42 (b) in
the United Mine Workers case was not prejudicial to the de-
121. Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Tampa So. R.R., 134 So. 529, 533 (Fla.
1931).
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fendants, it unquestionably was prejudicial to clear thinking
about the distinction between civil and criminal contempt. A
rigid interpretation is most desirable. Since Rule 42 (b) does
not specifically prohibit such a combined proceeding, in order
to eliminate any doubt, it should be amended to do so. State
courts which do not have a similar rule should adopt one.
From a policy point of view, the proposition that a de-
fendant is guilty of criminal contempt for the violation of a
void order is commendable. Our judicial system is founded
upon the view that our courts, not individuals, must decide
disputes involving correlative rights and duties. As noted,
the violation of an order erroneously issued constitutes crim-
inal contempt. An early English court thought the resort
to orderly processes of review was so important that the judge
stated "I consider the rule to be of such importance to the
interests and safety of the public and to the due administra-
tion of justice that it ought, on all occasions, to be inflexibly
maintained.' 1 22 No sound distinction can be made between
the necessity of preserving the interests and safety of the
public and the due administration of justice in the case of an
improvidently issued order and an order issued without juris-
diction. The choice between order and disorder is the same.
The failure to obtain a reversal of an order before violating
it produces equally undesirable consequences whether that or-
der was void or improvidently issued. An extension of the
United Mine Workers case so that all void orders must be
obeyed until reversed or vacated by orderly process seems
desirable.
122. See n. 81. Compare the statement of Justice Brewer in In re
Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 598 (1895), quoted above at n. 102.
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